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ABSTRACT 
This study is aimed at examining the relationship 
between corporate governance mechanisms and 
earnings management with voluntary disclosure 
(voluntary disclosure) as a moderating variable. 
Corporate governance is proxied and measured by 
Managerial Ownership (MGR) Institutional Ownership 
(INST), board size (BSIZE), and the independent 
Commissioner (KI). Voluntary Disclosure of Earnings 
Management proxied in this study uses the value of 
discretionary accruals, and Voluntary Disclosure is 
proxied by the disclosure index. The population of this 
study is all listed manufacturing companies in Indonesia 
Stock Exchange  from 2006 to 2011.  
The results of this study are first, there is an empirical 
evidence to suggest that there are negative effects of 
discretionary accruals managerial ownership, 
institutional ownership and a positive influence on the 
size of the board of directors. Overall, these results are 
consistent with research conducted by Pranata (2003) 
and Rajgopal (1998) that managerial ownership and 
institutional ownership become a constraint on earnings 
management practice. Second, testing the relationship 
between voluntary disclosure mechanism between 
corporate governance and discretionary accruals indicate 
that the earnings management practices will be carried 
out if the company is getting a lot of information. These 
results are consistent with the research conducted by 
Aryati (2003). Third, the composition of the 
independent commissioner was not statistically 
significant to the earnings management measures, and 
voluntary testing of these revelations on the relationship 
between the practice of earnings management and 
corporate governance mechanisms remains to show that 
the composition of an independent commissioner is not 
significant. This gives evidence that the ineffectiveness 
of the company's independent commissioner.  
KEYWORDS: Earnings management, Voluntary 
Disclosure, Corporate Governance  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Several accounting studies have examined the 
relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and earnings management. Warfield et al. 
(1995) found a negative relationship between 
managerial ownership and discretionary accruals as a 
measure of earnings management and a positive 
relationship between managerial ownership with the 
content of information in earnings. Midiastuty (2003) 
replicates the study by Warfield et al. (1995) that 
examined the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and earnings management, and 
tested the quality of the reported earnings of the 
Indonesian capital market.  Corporate governance 
mechanism is tested on managerial ownership, 
institutional ownership, board size and earnings 
management that affect the behavior and the quality of 
earnings. As a result, managerial ownership and 
institutional ownership are negatively related to 
earnings management, while the size of the board of 
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directors is positively related to earnings management. 
The opposite result was found by Gabrielsen et al. 
(1999) who found a positive effect between managerial 
ownership on earnings management and information 
content of earnings by using the Danish stock market 
data, the opposite result may be caused by different 
ownership structures among companies in the United 
States and in Denmark. Ownership structure in 
Denmark is characterized by concentrated ownership 
structures, while in the United States it is pread further.  
Khomsyiah (2003) provides an evidence of an 
association between the levels of implementation of 
corporate governance disclosure. Companies that 
implement good corporate governance will provide 
more information, in order to reduce information 
asymmetry. The information provided indicated the 
level of disclosure, the better the implementation of 
corporate gorvenance by a company, the more 
information is revealed. This study was aimed at 
examining the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and earnings management 
with voluntary disclosure as a moderating variable. 
Research Trueman and Titman (1988) revealed that the 
information asymmetry is a necessary condition to 
perform earnings management. Richardson (1998) 
found an evidence that information asymmetry as 
measured by the difference in the supply and sale prices 
(bid-ask spread) and the difference with the predictions 
of analysts is positively related to the level of earnings 
management. Therefore, when information asymmetry 
is high, shareholders do not have the resources, 
encouragement, or access to relevant information to 
monitor the actions that can bring earnings management 
practices.  
B. LITERATURE REVIEW  
Jensen and Meckling (1976), and Scott (2000) describe 
the relationship of agencies as a relation that arise, 
because of the contract specified shareholder (principal) 
that uses the management (agent) to perform services of 
interest to principal, in this case there is a separation 
between ownership and control of the company's 
contractual relations to run smoothly, the principal will 
delegate decision-making authority to the agent, and 
this relationship also needs to be in a contract that 
typically use accounting figures stated in the financial 
statements as the basis. In terms of the contract 
appropriate to align the interests of agents and 
principals that will bring up a conflict of interest, this is 
what is at the core of agency theory (Scott, 2000) Healy 
and Wahlen (1998) reveal that earnings management 
occurs when certain management uses judgment in 
financial statements and transactions to alter financial 
reports as a basis for the company's performance that 
aims to mislead the owners or shareholders or to 
influence contractual outcomes that rely on accounting 
figures reported.  
Corporate governance is a mechanism used to ensure 
that the shareholders of the company to obtain the 
return of the activities undertaken by the manager, or 
how shareholders exercise control over managers 
(Schleifer and Vishny, 1997). Khomsyiah (2003) 
conducted a study that examined the relationship of 
simultaneous implementation of corporate governance 
with the level of information disclosure in annual 
reports of public companies listed on the JSE. These 
results provide evidence of an association between the 
level of disclosure to the implementation of corporate 
governance, the better the implementation of Corporate 
Governance is done by a company, the more 
information is revealed. Conversely, companies that 
provide high disclosure in the annual report will show 
the implementation of corporate governance in the 
company. Information asymmetry that occurs between 
managers and shareholders as users of financial 
statements because shareholders can not observe all the 
performance and prospects of the company perfectly. In 
situations where the shareholders have less information 
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than managers, managers can use the flexibility to 
perform their owned earnings management.  
Trueman and Titman (1998) reveals that the asymmetry 
of information is a necessary condition to perform 
Earnings management. Richardson (1998) finds an 
evidence that information asymmetry, as measured by 
the difference in the supply and sale prices (bid-ask 
spread) and the difference with analysts' forecasts, is 
positively related to the level of earnings management. 
So, when information asymmetry is high, stakeholders 
do not have the resources, encouragement, or access to 
relevant information to monitor the actions of 
managers, who can bring the practice of earnings 
management. Based on some of the results of the above 
studies, alternative hypotheses formulated in this study 
are:  
H1:  Managerial ownership, institutional 
ownership, size and composition of the 
board of directors of independent 
commissioners have a significant effect on 
discretionary accrual  
H2:  With the voluntary disclosure it will 
reduce the association between 
discretionary accruals for managerial 
ownership, institutional ownership, size 
and composition of the board of directors 
of independent commissioners  
C. RESEARCH METHODS  
1. Sample Selection  
The data used in this study is a secondary data obtained 
from the annual report, the publication of the Business 
Data Centre Indonesia (PDBI), Capital Markets Data 
Center (PDPM), Gadjah Mada University Yogyakarta 
and other JSE publications includeing Managerial 
Ownership, size of the board of directors, Institutional 
Ownership, Independent Commissioner, financial 
statement data to calculate discretionary accruals and 
non-discretionary accruals, market value of equity, 
leverage, earnings before extraordinary items, earnings 
per share and net income, voluntary disclosure of data. 
The population of this study is all listed manufacturing 
companies in Indonesia Stock Exchange (ISE) from 
2006 to2011. The sampling technique was done by 
using purposive sampling.  
1. Independent Variables  
Mechanism Corporate governance is proxied and 
measured:  
Managerial ownership (MGR) is the 
percentage of shares owned by management 
who actively participates in decision-making 
process (commissioners and directors)  
Institutional ownership (INST), ie the 
percentage of shares owned by institutional 
investors. Institutional bias comes from the 
government or non-government as a company 
that has a great importance to the investment  
Size of the board of directors (BSIZE), ie the 
number of board members  
The Independent Commissioner (KI), the 
number of independent commissioners who 
joined the company commissioner. This study 
uses a dummy variable that is 0 for the 
companies with independent ownership and 1 
for the commissioner which does not have.  
2. Dependent Variable  
Earnings Management can be achieved from a variety 
of events, such as the value of discretionary accruals or 
change in method of accounting. This study used a 
value of discretionary accruals. It used the Modified 
Jones' model (Dechow, 1995) to measure the level of 
earnings management or discretionary accruals 
(DTAC). This model uses total accruals (TAC) 
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classified as discretionary component (DTAC) Dannon 
discretionary (NDTAC). It is defined as follows:  
TAC = NDTAC + DTAC TAC = + DTAC NDTAC  
The first step taken for the measurement of 
discretionary accruals is the value of total accruals as 
the dependent variable in the regression aimed at 
getting the parameters for calculating the non-
discretionary accruals value.  
TAC = net income (net income) - Operating cash 
flow (cash flow from operation) ..... (1)  
Next is to compute non-discretionary accruals estimated 
using the model of Jones (1991) estimated by OLS 
regression equation: The total value of the accrual of 
the estimated OLS regression equation as follows:  
TAC t / N t-1 = a 1 [1/TA t-1] + a 2 [ REV t / N t-1] + a 3 
[PPE t / N t-1] +  ........... (2)  
By using the above regression coefficients, it can be 
determined parameters (a 1, a 2 and a 3) of each 
company. The value of non-discretionary accruals 
(NDTAC) can be calculated by the formula:  
NDTAC = a 1 [1/TA t-1] + a 2 [( t REV - REC t) / N 
t-1] + a 3 [PPE t / N t-1] ..... (3)  
DTAC = TAC t /TA t-1 TAC DTAC = t / N t-1 - 
NDTAC ..(4) NDTAC ........ (4)  
Where:  
TAC = total accruals in period t  
NDTAC= Value of non-discretionary accrual  
DTAC=  Discretionary accrual  
REV t   = Changes in net sales in the period t  
REC t = Changes in net receivables in period t  
PPE = Property, Plan, and Equipment 
a 1 a 2 a 3 = coefficient of regression equation (2)  
a 1 a 2 a 3 = Fitted coefficient obtained from the 
regression equation (2)  
3. Moderating Variables  
Voluntary Disclosure  
For each sample firm, voluntary expression index is 
obtained by comparing scores with the scores obtained 
by the company that may be acquired. The company 
was given a score of 1 if it expresses items of 
information in the instrument and given  score 0 if it is 
not revealed.  
Method of Data Analysis  
Normality Test was done prior to hypothesis testing, to 
determine the distribution of the data to test the model 
Kolmogorov Smirnov normality. Regression Model 
study used multiple regression to examine the 
relationship between the dependent variable, 
moderating variable and independent variable.Overall, 
the OLS regression equation models used are:  
Model analysis for Discretionary Accruals  
DTAC i,t =  0 +  1 MGR+  2 INST+  3 
BSIZE+  4 CI  it .(6)  
Model analysis for the three components of corporate 
governance and earnings management are moderated by 
the voluntary disclosure.  
DTAC i, t =  0 +  1 MGR +  2 INST +  3 BSIZE +  4 
CI +  5 index +  6 index * MGR +  7 index 
* INST +  8 index * BSIZE +  9 index * CI 
+  i ....... (7 )  
D.  Results  
Descriptive Statistics  
The result of the normality test shows that significant 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov> 0.05 for institutional ownership. 
So it can be concluded that the data were normally 
distributed in this study only for institutional ownership 
data, while discretionary accruals and managerial 
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ownership and board size were not normally distributed. 
If the data by the number N> 30 was  not normally 
distributed by Central Limit Theorems, then testing can 
be obtained by using parametric test. (Gujarati, 2004) 
Since all probabilities are below 0.05 unless the 
composition of an independent commissioner, it means 
that the correlation between discretionary accruals with 
managerial ownership and institutional ownership and 
board size shows a negative relationship, meaning that 
managerial ownership, institutional ownership and 
board size the higher the discretionary accrual will be 
smaller and vice versa.  
Hypothesis Test 1  
This hypothesis was tested by using multiple regression 
test that showed the value of t-test for accrual 
discretionarry the managerial ownership is 0.451 with a 
probability value = 0.000 two-sided. The effect was 
statistically significant at the level of 0.05. 
Discretionarry accrual demonstrates the value of 
institutional ownership as 1.324 with a t
-test probability 
value = 0.044 two-sided. The effect was statistically 
significant at a level of 0.05. Coefficient indicates a 
negative value is -1.120, which means that the direction 
is negative. The effect was statistically significant at the 
level of 0.05. This means that statistically favor the 
alternative hypothesis, that there is a negative effect of 
discretionary accruals on Institutional Ownership. 
Discretionarry accrual of property size board shows the 
value of t-test with a probability value = 0.761 0.012 two-
sided. The effect was statistically significant at a level 
of 0.05. Coefficient indicates a positive value as 0.067. 
This result means that it statistically favor the 
alternative hypothesis, that there is a positive effect of 
discretionary accruals on Board Size, while 
discretionarry accrual to independent commissaries t
-test 
showed the value of -1.61 with a probability value = 
0.873 two-sided. This result means that statistically it 
does not support the alternative hypothesis, that there is 
no effect of discretionary accruals on the composition 
of an independent commissioner.  
Testing Hypothesis 2  
This hypothesis was tested by multiple regression test 
that showed the value of t-test for the accrual 
discretionary for managerial ownership, institutional 
ownership, and board size was statistically significant 
less than 0.05. The effect was statistically significant at 
the level of 0.05. With the moderating variables, ie 
voluntary disclosure to discretionarry accrual for 
institutional ownership, managerial ownership, board 
size showed a statistically significant influence on the 
whole below 0.05, at a rate of 0.05. This result means 
that statistically it favors the alternative hypothesis, 
namely discretionary accruals as a voluntary disclosure 
is smaller. However, the composition of independent 
commissioners remained statistically significant above 
0.05 or not statistically significant.  
Discussion  
The results indicate rejection of the null hypothesis that 
the empirical evidence supports the alternative 
hypothesis that there is a significant influence on the 
mechanisms of discretionary accruals for govenance 
corporate or managerial ownership, institutional 
ownership and the size of the board of directors, while 
the composition of an independent commissioner shows 
that it supports the null hypothesis or not there is an 
influence between the accrual discretionary 
composition of an independent commissioner. These 
results are consistent with the results of the research 
conducted by the Flower Institutions (2003), from the 
results of testing the dependent variable (discretionary 
accrual) with managerial ownership, institutional 
ownership and the size of the board of directors showed 
a negative effect. These results suggest that managerial 
ownership in Indonesia to become good corporate 
governance mechanisms that can reduce the problem of 
misalignment between the interests of managers with 
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owners or shareholders. These results are also 
consistent with the research conducted by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) and Warfield et al (1995) in the 
United States.  
For managerial ownership this study is consistent with 
the results of the study by Pranata (2003) which proved 
that Institusonal Owners also have a significant 
negative effect on discretionary accruals. It means that 
the greater the number of board of directors is, the 
higher the earnings management is. It means that the 
small size of the board of directors will be more 
effective in carrying out the functions of monitoring 
over financial reporting, thereby reducing the incentive 
for managers to manipulate earnings. These results are 
also consistent with the research done by Jensen (1993) 
and Vafeas (2000). The composition of independent 
commissioner showed no significant results. It means 
that the composition of an independent commissioner 
can not be used as a tool to prevent opportunistic 
managers from performing actions. This is because in 
Indonesia the number of independent commissioners 
composition may not affect the company's performance, 
consistent with the results of the research by Aryati 
(2005) which states that the independent commissioner 
is not able to affect the company's financial 
performance, even in Indonesia there are still many 
companies that do not have an independent 
commissioner The results of testing the second 
hypothesis implies that it statistically supports an 
alternative hypothesis, namely the smaller discretionary 
accruals as a voluntary disclosure. However, the 
composition of an independent commissioner remains 
statistically insignificant despite voluntary disclosure. 
These results are consistent with the result of the 
research by Veronica (2003) that prove that the 
disclosure of financial statements has a significant 
negative correlation. Companies with low levels of 
disclosure tend to do a lot more earnings management 
and vice versa, the company does a lot of earnings 
management tend to disclose less information.  
E. Conclusion  
Based on the hypothesis testing and discussion, it is 
concluded as follows. First, there is an empirical 
evidence that supports the alternative hypothesis, which 
states that there is a negative effect of discretionary 
accruals on managerial ownership, institutional 
ownership and a positive effect on the size of the board 
of directors. Overall, these results are consistent with 
the researches conducted by Pranata (2003), Rajgopal 
(1998), and Jensen and Meckling (1976) mentioning 
that managerial ownership, institutional ownership as a 
constraint on earnings management practice. Second, 
the relationship testing between voluntary disclosure 
mechanism corporate governance and discretionary 
accruals indicates that the practice of earnings 
management will be smaller if the company is getting a 
lot of information. These results are consistent with the 
research conducted by Aryati (2003). Third, the 
composition of the independent commissioners was not 
statistically significant to the earnings management 
measures, and voluntary testing of these revelations on 
the relationship between the practice of earnings 
management and corporate governance mechanisms 
remains to show that the composition of an independent 
commissioner is not significant. This gives an evidence 
of the ineffectiveness of the company's independent 
commissioner.  
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